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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

In re Water Rights of Park County Sportsmen's Ranch LLP v. Bargas,
986 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1999) (holding that certain provisions of the Colorado
Ground Water Management Act did not apply to the Laramie-Fox Hills
aquifer located outside of the Denver Basin in South Park, Colorado).
Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP ("Ranch") received three well
permits in 1992 allowing it to withdraw groundwater from 2307 acres of
land in South Park. In 1996, prior to the permits' expiration, the Ranch
applied to the Division I Water Court for a decree that would confirm the
Ranch's continued right to withdraw groundwater. At this time, several
appellees ("Opponents") filed an opposition to the Ranch's application, and
the matter was set for trial.
The State Engineer subsequently filed a series of determinations
After conducting numerous
regarding the Ranch's application.
investigations, the Engineer found that because there was stream-aquifer
contact along 3500 feet of the Tarryall Creek the groundwater underlying
that part of the Ranch's land was "not nontributary" as defined in a
provision of the Colorado Ground Water Management Act ("CGWMA")
but the groundwater underlying the remainder of the acreage was
"nontributary" as defined in a related section of the CGWMA. The
CGWMA defines "not nontributary" as a withdrawal of water that would,
within 100 years, deplete stream flow at an annual rate of greater than onetenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal. The statutes define
"nontributary" as any withdrawal of water that would not deplete stream
flow by one-tenth of one percent of withdrawals within 100 years.
Consequently, the Opponents requested the water court to determine
whether the statutory definitions of "not nontributary" and "nontributary"
applied to groundwater in the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer of South Park.
The water court found that sections of the CGWMA were ambiguous, but
after reviewing the legislative history, the water court concluded that the
General Assembly intended to refer to the four aquifers at their locations in
the Denver Basin area, and not to aquifers, such as the South Park aquifer,
located outside the Denver Basin. The court also noted that all parties
agreed that the water in question was tributary absent the CGWMA's
provisions. Thus, the court ruled, "all out-of-priority pumping would
require replacement or augmentation for 100% of out-of-priority
withdrawals." Due to this ruling, the Ranch could not claim a right to
remove groundwater under the CGWMA. Thus, it appealed the water
court's judgment.
On appeal, the Ranch argued that the water court's holding was
erroneous based upon plain language in the CGWMA statutory subsections.
It also contended that even if the court were correct in holding that the
CGWMA was inapplicable and that the water was tributary, the water
court erred by holding that the Ranch must replace 100% of its out-ofpriority diversions.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of the CGWMA
at issue applied only to the Denver Basin and that the Ranch did not have
to augment 100% of any out-of-priority withdrawals. In reaching this
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decision, the supreme court first defined and discussed the terms
"tributary," "nontributary," and "not nontributary." The court stated that
the right to tributary water was subject to the doctrine of prior
appropriation. In contrast, the right to withdraw nontributary groundwater
was more riparian in nature. It did not consist of a diversion requirement,
but was based on overlying land ownership and upon the operation of
statute.
In addition, the CGWMA created a relaxed standard for
determining the tributary character of water in four aquifers in the Denver
Basin, which included the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox
Hills aquifers. This standard meant that water in the four specified
aquifers, which generally would be considered tributary, would be
considered nontributary and thus, the prior appropriation doctrine would
not apply to these waters. Further, the CGWMA's definition of "not
nontributary" included groundwater in the four aquifers that still exceeded
the relaxed standard for determining tributariness. Thus, if groundwater
failed to meet the relaxed standard, owners of lands overlying "not
nontributary" water could still withdraw the water. However, the statute
required that any such water withdrawn must be replaced to the extent
necessary to prevent injurious effects on surface water rights.
In order to decide whether these relaxed standards applied to the
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer of South Park, the court first found that it could
not discover the answer from the plain meaning of the statute. It stated that
the statute was susceptible to more than one interpretation. Thus, the court
took a detailed look at the legislative history, including the General
Assembly's declarations made at the time it enacted the CGWMA. The
court discovered that the Assembly was well informed regarding the
geographic extent and hydrological conditions of the aquifers located
within the Denver Basin, yet there was no mention of such factual
representations regarding the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer in South Park.
The court also reviewed committee reports, which proposed the relaxed
definition of nontributary ground water. The reports indicted that the
committees' intent was that the relaxed definition would apply only to the
four aquifers in the Denver Basin. The supreme court also reviewed
statements from various senators, who introduced the bill to the General
Assembly. The statements corroborated what was also stated in Senate
hearings: that "the designation of the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers in subsection 10.5 was designed to modify the
definition of nontributary for purposes of the Denver Basin only."
The court found that there was no indication in the legislative record
that any senators were aware either of the existence of the South Park
formation or of the amount o augmentation necessary to avoid injury to
senior surface rights near the formation. Additionally, the title of the
statute itself was labeled "An Act Concerning Augmentation Requirement
for Water Well Pumping in the Denver Basin Aquifers" and the General
Assembly used the term "Denver Basin" interchangeably with the
enumeration of the four aquifers.
Thus, the court held that the enumeration of the four aquifers applied
solely to the formations of the aquifers located in the Denver Basin.
Therefore, the provisions at issue were not applicable to the South Park
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aquifer, and the Ranch was not entitled to use the relaxed standards set
forth in the statute for determining tributariness. Minus these particular
standards, the groundwater underlying the South Park property was
tributary and was be subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
However, the supreme court also stated that it did not agree with the
water court's ruling that because the groundwater was tributary, the Ranch
must replace 100% of its out-of-priority withdrawals. The court held that
"water is available for appropriation if the taking thereof does not cause
injury and that where senior users can show no injury by the diversion of
water, they cannot preclude beneficial use of water by another." Thus, if
the Ranch made an out-of-priority diversion, it was required to avoid
material injury to senior surface rights, but was not required to replace
100% of such diversions.
Stephanie Pickens

CONNECTICUT
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 740 A.2d 847
(Conn. 1999) (holding that the commission could not accept monetary
payment and in-kind services as mitigation for wetland destruction).
Based upon Stop & Shop's ("S & S") desire to construct a
supermarket, S & S applied to the Inland Wetlands Commission
("Commission") for a permit to conduct regulated activities on property
located within the town of Branford. Three wetlands and one watercourse
existed on the property. S & S's initial plan proposed to eliminate two
wetlands and create a new wetland adjacent to the third existing wetland.
The commission found that "significant activity," as defined in the
Branford inland wetlands and watercourse regulations, would occur on land
regulated as "wetlands" or "watercourses" in accordance with state
statutes.
Consequently, the Commission scheduled public hearings
pertaining to S & S's application.
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C.
("Branhaven"), intervened in the matter.
During the proceedings, S & S altered its proposal by suggesting a
detention or infiltration basin construction on the property, instead of
creating a new wetland. The Commission expressed skepticism about S &
S's new proposal's effect on the watershed. S & S amended its proposal
by offering monetary payment and in-kind services for future off-site
mitigation. The Commission accepted that proposal and integrated it into
the approval of the permit.
On March 13, 1997, the Commission condoned S & S's application
subject to nine conditions. Condition six declared that S & S give the
Commission money for future mitigation, restoration, improvement, and/or
study in the same watershed. Furthermore, condition six stipulated that the
banking mitigation amount was to be no less than $25,000 plus a like

